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I. INTRODUCTION 
Most treatises and articles on mistake begin with a statement 
on the difficulty of the subject.1  People err so frequently that the 
classification and rules systems cannot keep pace.2  In addition, the 
idea that a contract may be void or unenforceable because of 
mistake may seem antithetical to the idea that contracts, by their 
very nature, allocate risk.3  Nevertheless, contract avoidance 
through mutual mistake remains;4 its permanence is likely due to 
the idea that neither party should be liable for risks he or she did 
not agree to bear.5
The Minnesota Supreme Court recently revisited the 
relationship between mutual mistake and mutual assent in contract 
formation in Hy-Vee Food Stores, Inc. v. Minnesota Department of 
Health.6  The Hy-Vee decision involved interpreting whether a sale of 
cigarettes occurred under the rules of the federally funded Special 
Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and 
Children (WIC) when the parties to the sale claimed they made a 
mutual mistake and did not intend to exchange the cigarettes for a 
WIC voucher.7  The court decided that though the parties did not 
subjectively intend the exchange, the objective occurrence of a sale 
was sufficient for liability purposes.8
This note argues, however, that contract law is not the best 
context in which to understand the WIC rule in question.  Instead, 
this note suggests that the Minnesota Supreme Court should have 
construed the rule first in light of its relationship to the other rules 
on vendor violations, and second in light of Minnesota case law.  
The differences between the contract method and the contextual 
 1. See, e.g., 1 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 4.9 (rev. ed. 
1993) (“The subject of mistake is one of the most difficult in the law.”); Melvin A. 
Eisenberg, Mistake in Contract Law, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1573, 1575 (2003) (“The 
problems raised by mistake have been a source of persistent difficulty in contract 
law.”). 
 2. See CORBIN, supra note 1, § 4.9. 
 3. See Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 1575. 
 4. Id. 
 5. See 2 DAN B. DOBBS, DOBBS LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES—EQUITY—
RESTITUTION § 11.1 (2d ed. 1993); see also Val D. Ricks, American Mutual Mistake: 
Half-Civilian Mongrel, Consideration Reincarnate, 58 LA. L. REV. 663 (1998) 
(suggesting purposes for mutual mistake based on its history). 
 6. 705 N.W.2d 181 (Minn. 2005). 
 7. Id. at 186. 
 8. Id. at 190. 
2
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method for construing the rule reveal the Hy-Vee decision to be a 
harbinger of storms ahead in the welfare-reform debate. 
This note first examines the history of the interchange 
between actual and apparent assent.9  It then provides an in-depth 
description and analysis of the Minnesota Supreme Court’s holding 
in Hy-Vee10 and evaluates the decision in terms of contract law in 
alternate contexts.11  The note concludes by pinpointing a weakness 
in the welfare system that the Hy-Vee decision highlights and 
suggests changes to the current WIC rules.12
II. HISTORY 
A. Contract Formation 
The subjective theory of contract formation requires “actual 
mental assent” of both parties before a contract can be formed.13  
The popular phrase associated with this theory, “meeting of the 
minds,” originated in the mid-sixteenth century in an unresolved 
dispute before the Exchequer Chamber.14  The Sergeant of Law 
speaking for the defense defined the word “agreement” (Latin 
aggreamentum) as a compound of two words, aggregatio and mentium: 
a coming together, or meeting, of the minds.15  The phrase stuck.  
Though this false etymology often appears in American 
jurisprudence, the subjective theory never gained as strong a 
foothold here as in England.16
 9. See infra Part II. 
 10. See infra Part III. 
 11. See infra Part IV. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Samuel Williston, Mutual Assent in the Formation of Contracts, 14 ILL. L. REV. 
525, 525 (1919).  See also MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN 
LAW, 1870–1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 33–63 (1992); E. Allan 
Farnsworth, “Meaning” in the Law of Contracts, 76 YALE L.J. 939, 943 (1967).  The 
subjective theory conjoined with the “will” theory of contracts in the late 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.  Farnsworth, supra, at 944.  The will theory, 
much like the subjective theory, stated that courts should “neutral[ly] . . . carr[y] 
out the will of the contracting parties.”  HORWITZ, supra, at 35. 
 14. Farnsworth, supra note 13, at 943 (citing Reniger v. Fogossa, 75 Eng. Rep. 
1 (Ex. 1551)).  Farnsworth contradicts Williston, who dates the beginning of the 
subjective theory to the mid-eighteenth century.  See Williston, supra note 13, at 
525. 
 15. Farnsworth, supra note 13, at 944.  Aggreamentum does mean agreement, 
but “mentum” is a suffix used to create nouns out of verbs and has no etymological 
relationship to mentium (the genitive plural of mens, mind).  See ALEXANDER M. 
BURRILL, A NEW LAW DICTIONARY AND GLOSSARY 54 (1850). 
 16. Farnsworth, supra note 13, at 945.  Farnsworth suggests that the subjective 
3
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In the post-Civil War era, an “objective” theory replaced the 
“subjective” approach.17  Judge Learned Hand famously expressed 
the objective theory of contracts in Hotchkiss v. National City Bank of 
New York: 
A contract has, strictly speaking, nothing to do with the 
personal, or individual, intent of the parties . . . .  If, 
however, it were proved by twenty bishops that either 
party, when he used the words, intended something else 
than the usual meaning which the law imposes on them, 
he would still be held, unless there were some mutual 
mistake, or something else of the sort.18
The objective theory was eventually codified in the 
Restatement (First) of Contracts.19
The Minnesota Supreme Court adopted the First Restatement 
standard on mutual assent in New England Mutual Life Insurance Co. 
v. Mannheimer Realty Co.20  In that case, the parties had been 
negotiating a contract that may have allowed the defendant to 
avoid foreclosure on his house.21  The trial court found, however, 
that the plaintiff revoked the offer before negotiations ended.22  As 
a result, there was no mutual assent and no contract.23  Importantly, 
the court stated that “[n]ot meeting of the minds, but expression 
 
theory held much more weight in England because the United States never had an 
authoritative body of case law, similar to that of England, to give the argument 
“practical consequences.”  Id. 
 17. The “objective” theory has also been called the “classical model” of 
contract law.  See, e.g., Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Responsive Model of Contract Law, 
36 STAN. L. REV. 1107, 1108 (1984). 
 18. Hotchkiss v. Nat’l City Bank of New York, 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911).  
Williston cites Judge Learned Hand’s statement approvingly: “Though Judge 
Hand undoubtedly overstated the matter, beginning in the middle of the 19th 
century, the objective theory of contracts gained a strong foothold, which to this 
day has not been seriously challenged.”  1 SAMUEL WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON 
CONTRACTS § 3.5 (4th ed. 2006).  See generally the lecture by Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, Contract—Void and Voidable, in THE COMMON LAW (Mark DeWolfe 
Howe ed., 1963) (1881) (discussing the development of the objective theory). 
 19. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 19 (1932) (“The requirements 
of the law for the formation of an informal contract are: . . . (b) A manifestation of 
assent by the parties who form the contract to the terms thereof, and by every 
promisor to the consideration for his promise, except as otherwise stated in §§ 85-
94.”); WILLISTON, supra note 18, § 3:5. 
 20. 188 Minn. 511, 247 N.W. 803 (1933). 
 21. Id. at 511, 247 N.W. at 803. 
 22. Id. at 513, 247 N.W. at 804. 
 23. Id. 
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of mutual and final assent, is the operation that completes the 
making of a contract.”24
Subsequent cases spun out the idea that mutual assent “must 
be judged objectively, not subjectively.”25  In Cederstrand v. Lutheran 
Brotherhood, the plaintiff contended that she was fired contrary to 
her employment contract.26  She understood the contract to have 
arisen from various actions and speeches by the president of the 
company over time.27  The court, however, determined that the 
president’s speeches did not create a contract because they were 
given to a large group of employees, and that whole group of 
employees would not have understood the speech to be a contract 
offer as the plaintiff did.28
By the time of the Second Restatement, the rigidity of the 
objective theory had lessened because it did not always produce 
results that were just, fair, or in line with public policy.29  
Nevertheless, it still formed the basis of contract analysis.30  
Additionally, when adopted by statute in Minnesota, the Uniform 
Commercial Code (U.C.C.) applied the objective standard to the 
creation of a contract for the sale of goods.31
B. Contract Avoidance Through Mutual Mistake 
The idea that a court might void a contract for mutual mistake 
of the parties developed separately from the idea of objective 
 24. Id. (citations omitted). 
 25. Cederstrand v. Lutheran Bhd., 263 Minn. 520, 532, 117 N.W.2d 213, 221 
(1962) (citations omitted). 
 26. Id. at 520, 117 N.W.2d at 214. 
 27. Id. at 533–34, 117 N.W.2d at 221–22. 
 28. Id.  See also Bergstrom v. Sambo’s Rests., Inc., 687 F.2d 1250, 1256 (8th 
Cir. 1982) (stating that contract formation requires a “bargain” in which there is a 
“manifestation of mutual assent,” and that the “expressions of mutual assent must 
be objective,” using the Second rather than the First Restatement). 
 29. See, e.g., CORBIN, supra note 1, § 4.12; Eisenberg, supra note 17, at 1111–12. 
 30. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17 cmt. c (1981) (explaining 
that the requirement of a “manifestation of mutual assent” refers to “apparent 
assent” rather than a “mental reservation”).  See generally GRANT GILMORE, THE 
DEATH OF CONTRACT 55–85 (1974) (describing the “fall” of the classical model 
through a comparison of the First and Second Restatements, yet still relying on an 
objective contract theory throughout); Eisenberg, supra note 17 (arguing that even 
though the classical model has been theoretically abandoned, its focus on 
objectivity still prevails, and proposing an alternate model). 
 31. See MINN. STAT. § 336.2-204(1) (2002) (“a contract for sale of goods may 
be made in any manner sufficient to show agreement, including conduct by both 
parties which recognizes the existence of such a contract”) (originally adopted in 
Act of May 26, 1965, ch. 811, 1965 Minn. Laws 1306). 
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contract formation, but it confronts many of the same issues.  
Mutual mistake gained prominence in the United States in the first 
half of the nineteenth century.32  Though mutual mistake 
incorporated a number of legal influences,33 one of its early 
working theories was a “lack of consent” theory.34  This theory 
assessed contract formation subjectively: it gauged the reasons why 
a party entered into a contract and asserted that if the object of 
those reasons did not actually exist, then a contract could not have 
been formed because the assent “is understood to be null and 
ineffectual.”35
The Supreme Court case of Allen v. Hammond36 in 1837 
inaugurated mutual mistake as a legal doctrine.  In that case, 
Hammond’s brig was illegally captured off the coast of Portugal.37  
Upon his return home, Hammond hired Allen as his agent to 
retrieve his ship from Portugal, promising up to one-third of the 
value of the ship as commission.38  Unbeknownst to both, the 
Portuguese government had released the ship at the request of the 
U.S. government ten days earlier.39  The Court held that both 
parties had entered into the contract under a mistake and likened 
the situation to classic examples of mutual mistake.40  As a result, 
the Court declared the agreement void.41
Minnesota established its doctrine of mutual mistake in the 
late nineteenth century.  In an early case, Thwing v. Hall & Ducey 
 32. See Ricks, supra note 5, at 722–38 (noting occasional references to mutual 
mistake at the end of the eighteenth century, but dating the origin of modern 
American mutual mistake to the 1820s and1830s). 
 33. These include, most notably, Roman law and English Chancery decisions.  
On the origins of mutual mistake doctrines, see generally E. Sabbath, Effects of 
Mistake in Contracts: A Study in Comparative Law, 13 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 798 (1964); 
Ricks, supra note 5. 
 34. Ricks, supra note 5, at 722–23. 
 35. Joliffe v. Hite, 5 Va. (1 Call) 301, 316–17 (1798) (construing Quesnel v. 
Woodlief, 10 Va. (6 Call) 218 (1796), possibly one of the first true mutual mistake 
cases in America), cited in Ricks, supra note 5, at 721. 
 36. 36 U.S. 63 (1837). 
 37. Id. at 68. 
 38. Id. at 68–69. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 70–71.  For example, the Court cites a famous hypothetical example 
derived from Roman law: “If a horse be sold, which is dead, though believed to be 
living by both parties, can the purchaser be compelled to pay the consideration?”  
Id.  See also Ricks, supra note 5, at 685 (explaining that this is a common American 
hypothetical derived from Roman law, although in Roman accounts, the horse was 
a dead slave). 
 41. Allen, 36 U.S. at 72. 
6
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Lumber Co.,42 the parties entered into a contract for the sale of 
timbered land, which they later discovered had no timber on it.43  
The court declared the contract void, stating the rule of mutual 
mistake as: 
affirmative or defensive relief, such as is required by the 
circumstances, may be granted from the consequences of 
a mistake of any fact which is a material element of the 
transaction, and which is not the result of the mistaken 
party’s own violation of some positive legal duty, if there 
be no adequate remedy at law.44
The three basic elements of this rule: (1) that a mistake 
occurred; (2) that the mistake was material; and (3) that both 
parties made the mistake, rather than committing fraud, 
misrepresentation, or some other violation, remain basically 
unchanged in Minnesota today.45
Whether an element is material to an agreement is a common 
sticking point in mutual mistake decisions.46  In Gartner v. Eikill,47 
for example, the court had to decide whether, in a sale of land, the 
intended use of the land is material to the contract.48  The parties 
both thought that the land was zoned for manufacturing, but after 
the sale, the buyer discovered that it was under a building 
moratorium for re-zoning.49  In the suit for contract rescission, the 
seller argued that the buyer was not mistaken about the contents of 
the purchase agreement: he signed an agreement with reference to 
     42.     40 Minn. 184, 41 N.W. 815 (1889). 
 43. Id. at 185, 41 N.W. at 816.  The court determined that both parties were 
faultless and blamed the error on the man hired to do the estimate.  Id. at 186, 41 
N.W. at 816. 
 44. Id. at 187, 41 N.W. at 816. 
 45. See Dubbe v. Lano Equip., Inc., 362 N.W.2d 353, 355 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1985) (“[W]here parties enter into a contract while mutually mistaken concerning 
a basic assumption of fact on which the contract was made, and the mistake has a 
material effect on the agreed exchange, the contract is voidable by the parties 
adversely affected.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 152(1) (1981) 
(“Where a mistake of both parties at the time a contract was made as to a basic 
assumption on which the contract was made has a material effect on the agreed 
exchange of performances, the contract is voidable by the adversely affected party 
unless he bears the risk of the mistake . . . .”); see also Ricks, supra note 5, at 665–66. 
 46. See Ricks, supra note 5, at 666–68. 
     47.     319 N.W.2d 397 (Minn. 1982). 
 48. Id. at 398–99. 
 49. Id. at 398. 
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the land and the zoning ordinances.50  The court held, however, 
that “[t]he mistake . . . ‘went to the very nature’ of the property.”51
The understanding of the parties may speak to what is material 
in a contract.  In Winter v. Skoglund,52 the court based its 
invalidation of an agreement on a determination of the parties’ 
intent.53  In that case, the Vikings’ shareholders signed an 
agreement binding them to a right of first refusal before selling 
their shares.54  However, for agency reasons, one party was not 
bound.55  The trial court determined as a finding of fact that “it was 
the mutual intent of the parties that unless all holders of voting 
stock were bound, none of them would be bound.”56  Because all 
the parties were mistaken as to a basic assumption of the 
agreement, the court held the contract void.57
Winter demonstrates how gauging a mutual mistake can 
require determining each party’s subjective understanding of the 
contract.58  Tension between the subjective standard of mutual 
mistake and the strictly objective standard of contract formation 
confronted the court in Hy-Vee Food Stores, Inc. v. Minnesota 
Department of Health. 
III. THE HY-VEE DECISION 
A. The Facts 
On April 13, 2003, the father of a WIC-enrolled child 
purchased eight items, totaling $19.34, at the Windom Hy-Vee 
grocery store.59  Seven of the items were WIC eligible, and the 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 399 (quoting Sherwood v. Walker, 33 N.W. 919, 923 (Mich. 1887)).  
The court also held that the buyer had done his due diligence in inquiring about 
zoning ordinances.  Id. 
     52.     404 N.W.2d 786 (Minn. 1987). 
 53. Id. at 792. 
 54. Id. at 790–92. 
 55. Id. at 790–91. 
 56. Id. at 792. 
 57. Id. at 793. 
 58. See also Theisen’s, Inc. v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 309 Minn. 60, 243 N.W.2d 
145 (1976) (“A party who seeks to reform a written instrument must establish that 
the instrument failed to express the true intention of the parties because of 
mutual mistake . . . .”); Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 1578, 1620–29 (“A mistaken 
factual assumption is a mistake about the world that lies outside the mind of the 
party who holds the assumption.”). 
 59. Hy-Vee Food Stores, Inc., v. Minn. Dep’t of Health, 705 N.W.2d 181, 183 
(Minn. 2005).  The WIC Program targets low-income women who are pregnant or 
8
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eighth, a pack of cigarettes costing $3.19, was not.60  The father 
intended to pay cash for the cigarettes but asserted that his son 
distracted him at checkout and he forgot.61  The cashier also failed 
to notice the cigarettes.62  Thus, the cigarettes were inadvertently 
charged to the WIC voucher.63  Fearing her own status in the 
program, the child’s mother immediately reported the sale to her 
local WIC office.64
B. The Initial Response 
The Minnesota Department of Health (MDH) compliance 
coordinator terminated Hy-Vee’s status as a WIC-approved vendor 
for three years because of the violation.65  The Minnesota rule on 
vendor violations states, “the commissioner shall disqualify a 
vendor for three years if the vendor provides any . . . tobacco 
product in exchange for one or more vouchers.”66  On appeal, an 
administrative law judge found that even if the exchange were 
unintentional, summary disposition for MDH was appropriate 
because no material facts existed as to whether the transaction 
occurred.67
The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed.68  In its decision, 
the court of appeals deferred to the agency’s expertise in 
interpreting its own rule.69  At MDH’s prompting, the federal rule 
from which the state rule originated was introduced to the 
proceedings, and the parties agreed to construe the rules as 
equivalent.70  The federal rule requires state agencies to “disqualify 
 
breast-feeding, as well as children under five years old.  Id.  WIC Program 
participants exchange vouchers for nutritious food, from an approved list, at the 
stores of authorized vendors.  Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 184. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 183. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 183–84 (quoting the termination letter from MDH to Hy-Vee). 
 66. See MINN. R. 4617.0084, subpt. 4 (2006); Hy-Vee, 705 N.W.2d at 184. 
 67. Hy-Vee, 705 N.W.2d at 184.  The court noted that “summary disposition is 
the administrative equivalent of summary judgment.”  Id. at 184 n.3. 
 68. Hy-Vee Food Stores, Inc. v. Minn. Dep’t of Health, No. A04–548, 2004 WL 
2340189, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 19, 2004). 
 69. Id. at *1. 
 70. See id.  The exact division of power between federal and state 
governments is uncomfortably defined.  The state agency has responsibility for the 
management and accountability of “food delivery systems under its jurisdiction”; 
Food & Nutrition Services (FNS), however, may “require revision of a proposed or 
9
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a vendor for three years for ‘one incidence of the sale of . . . 
tobacco products in exchange for food instruments.’”71  The court 
acknowledged that neither “provide” nor “sale” is defined in state 
or federal rules.72  MDH adopted the statutory definition of sale: “a 
‘sale’ consists in the passing of title from the seller to the buyer for 
a price.”73
C. The Minnesota Supreme Court Decision 
With this background, the supreme court framed the issue 
around the definition of the word “sale” in the WIC tobacco rule.74  
Hy-Vee argued that a sale never occurred because mutual mistake 
removed a fundamental assumption of the transaction—neither 
party intended to exchange tobacco as part of the WIC 
transaction.75  Therefore the transaction should be “void and 
subject to rescission.”76
The court separated the WIC tobacco rule into three elements: 
(1) the sale, (2) of tobacco, (3) with payment by food instruments, 
in this case a WIC voucher.77  Because “sale” is not defined in the 
rules, the court relied on the U.C.C. definition of sale as “the 
passing of title from the seller to a buyer for a price.”78  Sale, the 
court said, is contract formation; it requires mutual assent, which 
may be inferred from the parties’ conduct.79  The court held that 
offering and accepting a WIC voucher as payment for cigarettes in 
the context of grocery check-out was sufficient objective evidence 
of assent to qualify as contract formation under the U.C.C.80
 
operating food delivery system.”  7 C.F.R. § 246.12(a)(1), (3) (2004); see also 7 
C.F.R. § 246.3(b) (2004) (stating that the state agency is responsible for program 
administration but must report to FNS). 
 71. Hy-Vee, 2004 WL 2340189, at *1 (emphasis in original) (quoting 7 C.F.R. § 
246.12(l)(l)(iii)(A)). 
 72. Id. at *2. 
 73. Id. at *2 (quoting MINN. STAT. § 336.2–106(1) (2004)). 
 74. Hy-Vee Food Stores, Inc., v. Minn. Dep’t of Health, 705 N.W.2d 181, 184–
85 (Minn. 2005).  The court uses the phrase “WIC tobacco rule” to refer to the 
state and federal rules collectively.  Id. at 183 n.1. 
 75. See Brief & Appendix of Appellant at 18–19, Hy-Vee Food Stores, Inc. v. 
Minn. Dep’t of Health, 705 N.W.2d 181 (Minn. 2005) (No. A04-0548), 2005 WL 
3133785. 
 76. Hy-Vee, 705 N.W.2d at 185. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 336.2-106(1) (2004)). 
 79. Id. at 185–86. 
 80. Id. at 186. 
10
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The fact that neither party intended to use the voucher 
mattered, not under the first element, but under the third element 
in the court’s analysis, the payment.81  The payment method 
determined whether a violation occurred.82  Hy-Vee argued that the 
parties intended a legal transaction of cigarettes for cash, but that 
neither intended to “engage in prohibited conduct.”83  The court 
concluded, however, that “the method of payment establishes not 
whether a sale has taken place, but whether a violation of the rule 
has occurred,” and that one could violate the rule without intent.84
The court found support for the idea that one could violate 
the rule without intent in the companion federal rules and the 
federal WIC regulatory history.85  The definition section of the 
federal rules specify that a WIC “vendor violation” may be 
“intentional or unintentional,”86 and the Department of 
Agriculture (USDA), which oversees the program, stated that the 
sale of tobacco products is a “flagrant violation[]” of program 
rules.87  Therefore the final rule required “a mandatory sanction for 
one incidence” of the sale of tobacco.88  The court, therefore, held 
that “strict liability” applied for violation of the WIC rules in 
Minnesota, and that MDH acted properly in suspending Hy-Vee for 
three years.89
D. The Dissent 
Justice Hanson wrote a dissent in which Justice Page joined.90  
It countered that the WIC tobacco rule had only one unified 
element, not three.91  Justice Hanson emphasized that “provide” 
 81. Id. at 184.  The court did not expressly address the second element, the 
presence of tobacco in the exchange, because neither party contested it.  Id. at 
185. 
 82. Id. at 186. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 85. See id. at 187–90.  Both the majority and dissent cited passages from the 
Federal Register, wherein FNS promulgates and explains its new rules.  See, e.g., 
WIC/Food Stamp Program Vendor Disqualification, 64 Fed. Reg. 13,311 (Mar. 18, 
1999) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 246) (“State agencies must fully implement 
the provisions of this rule no later than May 17, 2000.”). 
 86. Hy-Vee, 705 N.W.2d at 187 (citing 7 C.F.R. § 246.2 (2005)). 
 87. WIC/Food Stamp Program Vendor Disqualification, 64 Fed. Reg. at 
13,314. 
 88. Id. at 13,314, cited in Hy-Vee, 705 N.W.2d at 189 n.7. 
 89. Hy-Vee, 705 N.W.2d at 189–90. 
 90. Id. at 181. 
 91. Id. at 191 n.1 (Hanson, J., dissenting); see supra notes 76–79 and 
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was not defined in the Minnesota statute, nor was “sale” defined in 
the federal statute.92  He agreed with the majority that the intent 
requisite for a “sale” may be demonstrated objectively.93  Justice 
Hanson argued, however, that the word “sale” should not be read 
in isolation; rather, “in the rule, ‘sale’ must be read in conjunction 
with the words ‘in exchange for food instruments.’”94  If the 
elements are dependent rather than independent, then sale and 
method of payment are inter-related.95  The question of intent 
relevant to a sale becomes relevant to the method of payment as 
well.96  Justice Hanson concluded that whether the parties intended 
the legal exchange, tobacco-for-cash, or the prohibited one, 
tobacco-for-voucher, presented a question of fact.97
Justice Hanson argued by analogy that the mutual mistake of 
fact in this case was similar to the mutual mistake framework of 
Winter.98  In that case, the court voided a contract for mutual 
mistake because the involved parties were mistaken about whom 
was bound by the contract: changing this fundamental assumption 
“would materially change the bargain.”99  Justice Hanson admitted 
that the Hy-Vee case does not conform exactly to a traditional 
understanding of mutual mistake because the mistake came after 
the acceptance of an offer; he asserted, however, “the underlying 
principles of the mutual mistake doctrine provide an appropriate 
framework” to rescind the transaction.100  “[B]ecause the use of a 
‘food instrument’ is the determinative fact under the WIC tobacco 
rule, the method of payment goes to the ‘very nature’ of the 
transaction,” thereby fitting into the mutual mistake framework.101
Justice Hanson looked to the legislative history of the WIC 
rules to support his argument.  He asserted that holding vendors 
strictly liable would be unusually severe given the context of the 
 
accompanying text discussing the majority’s analysis of the rule in three parts. 
 92. Hy-Vee, 705 N.W.2d at 190 (Hanson, J., dissenting). 
 93. Id. at 191. 
 94. Id. 
 95. See id. (noting that no regulation is violated by the mere sale of cigarettes; 
a violation only occurs if the sale is completed using the proscribed method of 
payment). 
 96. Id. at 191–92. 
 97. Id. at 190. 
 98. Id. at 191–92; see supra notes 53–58 and accompanying text. 
 99. Hy-Vee, 705 N.W.2d at 191–92 (Hanson, J., dissenting) (citing Winter v. 
Skoglund, 404 N.W.2d 786, 793 (Minn. 1987)). 
 100. Id. at 192 n.2. 
 101. Id. at 192 (citing Gartner v. Eikill, 319 N.W.2d 397, 399 (Minn. 1982)). 
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rest of the WIC rules.102  The WIC tobacco rule grew out of a 
concern about “intentional or deliberate” fraud and abuse among 
WIC vendors.103  Though the statutory definition of “vendor 
violation” includes intentional and unintentional acts, the history 
of the definition is contradictory, stating that “no disqualification 
will result, and a vendor violation does not occur when a cashier 
commits a ‘minor unintentional’ error without management 
knowledge.”104  The other WIC rules require a pattern of “equally 
serious violations before a mandatory disqualification is 
imposed.”105  He asserted reluctance to “imply administrative 
agency authority to impose more severe sanctions where express 
authority to do so is not clear.”106  As a result, Justice Hanson would 
have held that a WIC vendor may attempt to show mutual mistake 
as an affirmative defense for violation of the WIC tobacco rule.107
IV. ANALYSIS 
The Hy-Vee decision was the first time Minnesota courts 
interpreted the WIC tobacco regulations.108  The discomfort that 
the outcome of this case caused both the majority and the dissent 
provides an opportunity to look beyond U.C.C. contract formation 
and mutual mistake to find a more suitable hermeneutic 
framework for the WIC tobacco rule.109  Attempting to define the 
 102. Id. (citing 7 C.F.R. § 246.12(l)(iii)(B)–(F) (2005); 7 C.F.R. § 246.12(l)(iv) 
(2005)) (“[O]ther WIC rules require proof of a pattern or series of what appear to 
be regarded by USDA as equally serious violations before a mandatory 
disqualification is imposed.”). 
 103. Id. at 193 (quoting Food Assistance: Efforts to Control Fraud and Abuse in the 
WIC Program Can Be Strengthened (United States General Accounting Office, Report 
to Congressional Committees, Aug. 1999), at 19, available at http://www.fns.usda. 
gov/wic/resources/efforts.pdf). 
 104. Id. (quoting WIC: Food Delivery Systems, 64 Fed. Reg. 32,308, 32,316 
(June 16, 1999) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 246)).  See also WIC: Food Delivery 
Systems, 83,248, 83,260 (Dec. 29, 2000) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 246) 
(publishing the final rule, stating that not all vendor violations will result in 
vendor sanctions), quoted in Hy-Vee, 705 N.W.2d at 193, 194 n.3 (Hanson, J., 
dissenting). 
 105. Id. (citing 7 C.F.R. § 246.12(l)(iii)(B)–(F)). 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 194. 
 108. See Brief & Appendix of Appellant at *11, Hy-Vee, 705 N.W.2d 181 (No. 
A04-0548). 
 109. On the court’s discomfort, see the majority’s statement, “we note that our 
court has recognized that there are times, in applying an administrative rule in a 
contested case, that the result may seem harsh,” Hy-Vee, 705 N.W.2d at 190, and 
the dissent’s statement, “[t]he facts presented here do not fit precisely within the 
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term “provide” used in the Minnesota rule, rather than adopting an 
ill-fitting U.C.C. definition of sale, demonstrates the relevance of 
the history of the WIC program and the structure of the WIC rules 
to the inquiry at hand.110  The problems confronting the court in 
Hy-Vee suggest a change in the federal and state rules may be 
appropriate.111
A. The Contract Analysis 
Understanding the outcome of this case requires looking at its 
fundamental assumptions and asking why the Minnesota Supreme 
Court decided the question as a matter of contract law.  The 
starting point for the majority was whether a sale of tobacco 
occurred.112  The federal WIC rule uses the word “sale,” and the 
rule adopted by MDH uses the word “provide,” as the court and 
both parties acknowledged.113  Neither term is defined in the WIC 
rules.114
The case moved into contract analysis because of the way the 
parties chose to define the terms.  At the appellate level, MDH 
asserted that “sale” in the federal rule not only meant the same as 
“provide,” but that it also bore the meaning of “sale” as defined in 
the U.C.C.115  From the record, it is not clear why MDH chose to 
combine the wording of the federal rule with the U.C.C. definition 
of “sale” to explicate its own rule.  The likely reason is that the 
U.C.C. presented an already accepted definition where MDH had 
not previously defined its terms.116  Hy-Vee did not object to this 
 
mutual mistake framework because the mistaken tender of payment arguably took 
place after the customer had accepted Hy-Vee’s offer of groceries.”  Id. at 192 
(Hanson, J., dissenting). 
 110. See infra Part IV.B-C. 
 111. See infra Part IV.F. 
 112. See Hy-Vee, 705 N.W.2d at 185. 
 113. See id. at 183 n.1 (citing 7 C.F.R. § 246.12(l)(1)(iii)(A) (2004); MINN. R. 
461.0084, subpt. (4) (2003)). 
 114. See id. 
 115. Hy-Vee, 705 N.W.2d at 186 (citing Hy-Vee Food Stores, Inc. v. Minn. Dep’t 
of Health, No. A04-548, 2004 WL 2340189 *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 19, 2004)). 
 116. See Brief and Appendix of Respondent at *23, Hy-Vee Stores, Inc. v. Minn. 
Dep’t of Health, 705 N.W.2d 181 (Minn. 2005) (No. A04-0548), 2005 WL 3133788.  
The court stated in its ruling, “[t]he terms ‘provide’ and ‘sale’ are not defined in 
the state or federal rules.”  MDH adopted the Minnesota Statutes section 336.2-
106(1) (2004) definition of “sale”: “the passing of title from the seller to the buyer 
for a price.”  Hy-Vee, 2004 WL 2340189, at *1.  The juxtaposition of the two 
sentences implies causality. 
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definition.117  At the supreme court, both parties agreed at the 
outset to use the word “sale” in accordance with the U.C.C. 
definition.118
The U.C.C. framework limited the court’s analytical options.  
Both the majority and dissent agreed that a sale occurred in the 
check-out lane.119  A strict reading of the objective standard of 
contract formation required this conclusion.  Most reasonable 
people would believe that a sale of cigarettes occurred if a person 
went through the check-out line, put the cigarettes on the counter, 
offered some form of payment that was accepted, and left with the 
cigarettes and a receipt listing the cigarettes as purchased.  Thus 
for the majority, a “sale” occurred and the vendor was in violation 
of the rule.120  For the dissent, the contract theory of mutual 
mistake applied, but it applied to the method of payment, not to 
the exchange.121
Neither the majority nor the dissent, however, was comfortable 
with the outcome it proposed for this case.  The majority defended 
Hy-Vee’s three year suspension at the conclusion of the opinion, 
noting that enforcement of administrative rules may “yield a harsh 
or undesirable result in a particular case” and still be valid.122  
Contract law, however, abhors penalties.123  At its essence, contract 
law allocates risk between parties.124  The Hy-Vee court, however, 
used it to assign an administrative penalty, perhaps accounting for 
the incongruity of a three-year suspension for a $3.19 sale. 
The dissent’s analysis fits no more comfortably into a contract 
framework.  Though the dissent applied the mutual mistake theory, 
it admitted, “[t]he facts presented here do not fit precisely within 
the mutual mistake framework because the mistaken tender of 
payment arguably took place after the customer had accepted Hy-
Vee’s offer of groceries.”125  This analysis, however, proves too 
much.  The “use of a ‘food instrument’” is a “determinative fact” 
 117. Hy-Vee, 705 N.W.2d at 185. 
 118. Id. at 183. 
 119. Id. at 186, 191. 
 120. See supra Part III.C. 
 121. See supra Part III.D. 
 122. Hy-Vee, 705 N.W.2d at 190 (quoting Mammenga v. State Dep’t of Human 
Servs., 442 N.W.2d 786, 789 (Minn. 1989)). 
 123. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356 (1981) (providing that 
penalties for breach of contract are unenforceable on grounds of public policy). 
 124. See Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 1575. 
 125. Hy-Vee, 705 N.W.2d at 192 (Hanson, J., dissenting). 
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under every WIC rule, not just the tobacco rule.126  Though the 
dissent proposed a narrow rule, that mutual mistake may be an 
affirmative defense to the three-year mandatory disqualification of 
the WIC tobacco rule,127 there is no reason not to extend the 
mutual mistake defense to all WIC transactions, or even, by 
analogy, all food stamp transactions.  The dissent’s analysis, though 
more equitable than the majority’s, is ultimately unworkable. 
B. The Contextual Analysis 
The use of “provide” in the state rule may indicate the drafters’ 
intention to distinguish the WIC exchange from a “sale” in the 
U.C.C. context.128  This intention is supported by the context of the 
Minnesota rule, including the background of the federal WIC 
rules, the recent welfare reform movement, the regulatory history 
of the WIC tobacco rule, and the adoption of the Minnesota WIC 
rules. 
1. The Federal WIC Rules 
a.  Background 
The WIC Program provides supplemental food and nutrition 
education for pregnant and nursing women and for young 
children.129  It developed as part of the Child Nutrition Act of 1966, 
which was based on Congressional findings that a lack of nutrition 
in early childhood interfered with physical and mental 
development.130  In 2005, the year of the Hy-Vee decision, the WIC 
program “served approximately 8 million participants, including 
approximately 1.9 million women, 2.1 million infants, and 2 million 
children ages five and under.”131
 126. Id. 
 127. See id. at 194. 
 128. Note that the administrations changed, as did the Commissioner of 
Health, between 2000 when the rule was promulgated and 2005 when the case was 
heard; thus, the agency’s position in this case is not internally inconsistent. 
 129. 42 U.S.C. § 1786(a) (Supp. 2005). 
 130. See id.  WIC was established by an amendment to the Child Nutrition Act 
promulgated in 1972.  OFFICE OF ANALYSIS, NUTRITION AND EVALUATION, 2005 WIC 
VENDOR MANAGEMENT STUDY: FINAL REPORT, Report No. WIC-06-WICVM-02, at 2 
(Apr. 2007), available at http://www.fns.usda.gov/oane/menu/published/WIC/ 
FILES/2005WICVendor.pdf. 
 131. Nat’l Women, Infants, & Children Grocers Ass’n v. Food & Nutrition 
Serv., 416 F. Supp. 2d 92, 95 (D.D.C. 2006). 
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WIC is structured as a grant-in-aid program.132  Grants-in-aid, as 
opposed to other sorts of federal disbursements, are a mechanism 
by which the federal government targets “specific categories of 
spending, including narrowly defined sets of services or specific 
target populations.”133  Despite its narrow focus, however, the 
changes which brought about the WIC tobacco rule need to be 
seen in light of the welfare reform movement of the mid-1990s.134
b. Welfare Reform 
The tobacco rule is one of nine specific provisions originally 
promulgated in 1998 with the stated purpose of standardizing state 
responses to WIC Program violations.135  The impetus for the new 
provisions grew out of an Office of the Inspector General (OIG) 
audit in September 1995 that “disclosed widely inconsistent 
sanction policies among the States for WIC vendors who commit 
similar or identical WIC Program violations.”136  USDA, the agency 
that both oversees WIC and was responsible for the rule change, 
implemented “mandatory WIC Program disqualifications” for the 
nine provisions enumerated in the new rule, including the tobacco 
 132. 42 U.S.C. § 1786(c) (2000).  Section (c)(1) explains:  
[t]he Secretary may carry out a special supplemental nutrition program 
to assist State agencies through grants-in-aid and other means to provide, 
through local agencies, at no cost, supplemental foods and nutrition 
education to low-income pregnant, postpartum, and breastfeeding 
women, infants, and children who satisfy the eligibility requirements 
specified in subsection (d) of this section. 
Id. 
 133. Lynn A. Blewett & Michael Davern, Distributing State Children’s Health 
Insurance Program Funds: A Critical Review of the Design and Implementation of the 
Funding Formula, 32 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 415, 416 (2007). 
 134. For sources discussing welfare reform, see generally Charles Barrilleaux & 
Paul Brace, Notes From the Laboratories of Democracy: State Government Enactments of 
Market- and State-Based Health Insurance Reforms in the 1990s, 32 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y 
& L. 655 (2007) (analyzing the changes in state policies and concluding that 
market-based approaches to health insurance will not solve the problem of 
underinsurance); Robert F. Schoeni, What Has Welfare Reform Accomplished?: Impacts 
on Welfare Participation, Employment, Income, Poverty, and Family Structure (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7627, 2000) (examining the 
effectiveness of welfare reforms from the early 1990s to 1996); William P. Tunell, 
Jr., Welfare Reform: The Case for a Systematic Approach, 21 J. LEGIS. 301 (1995) (urging 
a systemic approach to welfare reform). 
 135. Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants and 
Children (WIC): WIC/Food Stamp Program (FSP) Vendor Disqualification, 63 
Fed. Reg. 19,415, 19,416 (Apr. 20, 1998) (codified at 7 C.F.R. § 246 (2007)). 
 136. Id. at 19,417. 
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violation.137
USDA needed to standardize the implementation of the 
provisions so that the WIC Program could coordinate with the 
Food Stamp Program.138  The key welfare reform bill of 1996, 
known as the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), mandated, among other things, 
that food vendors disqualified from the Food Stamp Program 
should be automatically disqualified from the WIC Program for the 
same time period with no judicial or administrative review.139  The 
same would be true of vendors disqualified from the WIC Program; 
they would be reciprocally disqualified from the Food Stamp 
Program.140  USDA thereby sought to decrease vendor violations 
that drained the program economically.141  The rule change that 
created the tobacco provision thus grew out of the welfare reform 
bill of 1996.142
c. The Tobacco Rule 
While seven of the provisions standardized in the new rule had 
previously been treated as violations in the WIC Program, two were 
new.143  The first new rule was “trafficking,” defined as buying or 
selling WIC food instruments for cash, consideration other than 
eligible food, or for firearms, ammunition, explosives, or 
 137. Id. at 19,417–18. 
 138. Id. at 19,415–16. 
 139. Id.  See also Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation 
Act (PRWORA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 843(g)(1), 110 Stat. 2105, 2332 
(1996). 
 140. PRWORA § 729(j). 
 141. See Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants and 
Children (WIC): Food Delivery Systems, 65 Fed. Reg. 83,248, 83,248 (Dec. 29, 
2000) (codified at 7 C.F.R. § 246 (2007)) (“The rule will increase program 
accountability and efficiency in food delivery and related areas and decrease 
vendor violations of program requirements and loss of program funds.”); see also 
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FOOD ASSISTANCE: EFFORTS TO CONTROL FRAUD AND 
ABUSE IN THE WIC PROGRAM CAN BE STRENGTHENED, NO. GAO/RCED-99-224, 22–23 
(1999) (concluding that program abuse regularly went undetected costing the 
program significant funds), available at http://www.fns.usda.gov/wic/resources/ 
Efforts.pdf. 
 142. For the implementation date, see Special Supplemental Nutritional 
Program for Women, Infants and Children (WIC): Food Delivery Systems; Delay of 
Implementation Date, 66 Fed. Reg. 52,849, 52,849 (Oct. 18, 2001) (codified at 7 
C.F.R. § 246 (2007)). 
 143. See Special Supplemental Nutritional Program for Women, Infants and 
Children (WIC): WIC/Food Stamp Program (FSP) Vendor Disqualification, 63 
Fed. Reg. 19,415, 19,416 (Apr. 20, 1998) (codified at 7 C.F.R. § 246 (2007)). 
18
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controlled substances.144  The provision preventing the sale of 
tobacco and alcohol in exchange for WIC vouchers was the second 
new provision.145  USDA deemed both trafficking and tobacco and 
alcohol sales such “serious” violations that “only one incidence 
warrants disqualification” because they “completely undermine 
program goals.”146  The other provisions all require a “pattern of 
incidences” before the state agency determines that a violation 
occurred.147
In setting these mandatory sanctions, USDA echoed the 
“fundamental values” of welfare reform: “work, responsibility, and 
family.”148  The mandatory sanctions on tobacco, alcohol, and 
trafficking, USDA claimed, not only helped with the economic 
goals of welfare reform, they also reinforced the nutrition goals of 
the WIC Program by keeping pregnant mothers and young 
children away from alcohol and drugs.149  Simultaneously, however, 
USDA disregarded another tenet of PRWORA: giving “States the 
responsibility that they have sought to reform the welfare system.”150
2. The Rule’s Administrative History 
Though there was no deviation from the original rule USDA 
 144. Id.  The rule defers to the definition of “controlled substances” in 21 
U.S.C. § 802(6) (2000) (defining a controlled substance as “a drug or other 
substance, or immediate precursor, included in schedule I, II, III, IV, or V of part 
B of this subchapter.  The term does not include distilled spirits, wine, malt 
beverages, or tobacco, as those terms are defined or used in subtitle E of the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1986.”). 
 145. WIC: WIC/Food Stamp Program (FSP) Vendor Disqualification, 63 Fed. 
Reg. at 19,416. 
 146. Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants and 
Children (WIC): WIC/Food Stamp Program (FSP) Vendor Disqualification, 64 
Fed. Reg. 13,311, 13,314 (Mar. 18, 1999) (codified at 7 C.F.R. § 246 (2007)).  See 
also Hy-Vee Food Stores, Inc. v. Minn. Dep’t of Health, 705 N.W.2d 181, 189 n.7 
(Minn. 2005) (quoting the same language of USDA). 
 147. WIC: WIC/Food Stamp Program (FSP) Vendor Disqualification, 64 Fed. 
Reg. at 13,314. 
 148. Press Release, The White House, President Statement on Welfare Reform 
Bill (Aug. 22, 1996), 1996 WL 475378. 
 149. See Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants and 
Children (WIC): Food Delivery Systems, 65 Fed. Reg. 83,248, 83,248 (Dec. 29, 
2000) (codified at 7 C.F.R. § 246 (2007)) (“The rule will increase program 
accountability and efficiency in food delivery and related areas and decrease 
vendor violations of program requirements and loss of program funds.”); WIC: 
WIC/Food Stamp Program (FSP) Vendor Disqualification, 64 Fed. Reg. at 13,315 
(considering the potential damage done to the fetus by alcohol and illicit drugs). 
 150. Press Release, The White House, supra note 148. 
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Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) proposed,151 the history of the 
rule demonstrates considerable confusion over the intent standard 
requisite for a vendor violation.  The final rule defines “vendor 
violation” as “any intentional or unintentional action of a vendor’s 
current owners, officers, managers, agents, or employees (with or 
without the knowledge of management) that violates the vendor 
agreement or Federal or State statutes, regulations, policies, or 
procedures governing the Program.”152  The majority in Hy-Vee 
relied on this definition.153  By contrast, the dissent cited the 
“contradictory” history of the definition of a vendor violation, in 
which USDA stated that a “minor, unintentional error” of a cashier 
would not be considered a violation.154
Oddly enough, the textual basis of both arguments stems from 
the same passage in the Federal Register—the definition of vendor 
violation.155  The full passage explains the role of intent vendor 
violations: 
“Vendor violation” is proposed to be defined as any 
intentional or unintentional action of a vendor (with or 
without management knowledge) which violates the 
Program statute or regulations or State agency policies or 
procedures.  This definition would clarify that vendors 
should be held accountable for violations, whether they 
are deliberate attempts to violate program regulations, or 
inadvertent errors, since both ultimately result in 
increased food costs and fewer participants being served.  
This definition clarifies that it would not be necessary for 
the State agency to ascertain the intent behind an action 
which, whether inadvertent or deliberate, has the same 
negative effect on the Program.  The Department 
acknowledges that the inherent complexity of the WIC 
transaction is such that, even with training and 
 151. See Special Supplemental Nutrition for Women, Infants and Children 
(WIC): Food Delivery Systems, 64 Fed. Reg. 32,308, 32,316 (June 16, 1999); 7 
C.F.R. § 246.2 (2007).  FNS is the division of USDA responsible for promulgating 
WIC rules.  See 7 C.F.R. § 246.2 (delegating administration of the WIC Program 
within USDA to FNS). 
 152. 7 C.F.R. § 246.2. 
 153. Hy-Vee Food Stores, Inc. v. Minn. Dep’t of Health, 705 N.W.2d 181, 187 
(Minn. 2005). 
 154. Id. at 193 (Hanson, J., dissenting) (citing Special Supplemental Nutrition 
Program for Women, Infants and Children (WIC): Food Delivery Systems, 64 Fed. 
Reg. 32,308, 32,316 (June 16, 1999)); supra text accompanying note 104. 
 155. See WIC: Food Delivery Systems, 64 Fed. Reg. at 32,316.  This definition is 
reiterated and slightly expanded in WIC: Food Delivery Systems, 65 Fed. Reg. 
83,248, 83,260 (Dec. 29, 2000) (codified at 7 C.F.R. § 246 (2007)). 
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supervision, cashiers may occasionally make unintentional 
errors.  While this definition would include both 
intentional and unintentional actions (with or without 
management knowledge), this does not mean that a 
minor unintentional action by a cashier without 
management knowledge would result in disqualification.  
State agencies have a wide range of actions that they may 
take as a result of a vendor violation, including assessing a 
claim, requiring increased training, identifying the vendor 
as a high-risk vendor subject to monitoring, assessing 
administrative fines, and imposing a sanction.156
Later, USDA reiterated these ideas specifically in response to a 
query about the “mandatory” nature of vendor sanctions.157
The Hy-Vee court wrestled with this passage because it 
conflated the ideas of purpose and outcome in its definition of 
intent.158  The definition clarifies that intentional violations are 
“deliberate attempts to violate program regulations,”159 a purpose-
based standard.  However, the program is most concerned with 
violations, intentional or not, which “ultimately result in increased 
food costs and fewer participants being served”:160 an outcome-
based standard. 
The explanation indicates an exception for “minor 
unintentional action by a cashier” even within a rubric forbidding 
“intentional” and “unintentional” violations.161  These actions are 
still violations, but here the lack of purpose to violate the rule and 
the overall lack of harm to the program are mitigating factors, 
resulting in lesser penalties, certainly not disqualifications. 
3. Minnesota’s Adoption of the WIC Rules 
The State Commissioner of Health (Commissioner) has 
authority to “make such reasonable rules as may be necessary” to 
carry out the responsibilities granted along with the federal aid for 
maternal and child welfare services.162  In doing so, the 
 156. WIC: Food Delivery Systems, 64 Fed. Reg. at 32,316. 
 157. See WIC: Food Delivery Systems, 65 Fed. Reg. at 83,260. 
 158. See, e.g., Hy-Vee, 705 N.W.2d at 189 (asserting that the history of the 
vendor violation standard is clear and purposeful); see also id. at 193 (Hanson, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that the same history is contradictory and case specific). 
 159. WIC: Food Delivery Systems, 64 Fed. Reg. at 32,216. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. MINN. STAT. § 144.11 (2006).  See also 7 C.F.R. § 246.12(a)(1) (2006) 
(delegating responsibility for fiscal management and food delivery systems to state 
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Commissioner must design Minnesota rules to garner as much 
federal funding as possible.163  The companion federal rules 
delegate the administration of the WIC Program to the state,164 but 
they require that all plans must follow federal guidelines and be 
approved by FNS.165  Within this structure, the Commissioner 
retains some discretion in program design so long as the state rules 
comport with the purpose of the federal rules. 
Accordingly, MDH promulgated its Statement of Need and 
Reasonableness (SONAR) concerning the proposed state rules in 
April of 2000.166  MDH exercised its discretion in, among other 
things, defining what constitutes a “pattern” of violations,167 in 
defining “vendor,”168 and in changing the federal language “a 
pattern of receiving, transacting and/or redeeming food 
instruments outside of authorized channels” into “laundering 
vouchers.”169  While the SONAR discussed most of its changes to 
the federal guidelines at length,170 it did not comment on choosing 
the word “provide” instead of the word “sale” in the tobacco rule.171
 
agencies). 
 163. MINN. STAT. § 144.10 (2006) (“Such plans shall be designed to secure for 
the state the maximum amount of federal aid which is possible to be secured on 
the basis of the available state, county, and local appropriations for such 
purposes.”). 
 164. 7 C.F.R. § 246.3(b)(2006) (“The State agency is responsible for the 
effective and efficient administration of the Program.”). 
 165. 7 C.F.R. § 246.4 (2006) (laying out the requirements that the state must 
follow in order to receive FNS approval). 
 166. See Minnesota Department of Health, “WIC Vendor Rules SONAR Dated 
4/3/00,” in Brief of Appellant at Appendix, Hy-Vee Food Stores, Inc. v. Minn. 
Dep’t of Health, 705 N.W.2d 181 (Minn. 2005) (No. A04-0548). 
 167. Id. at 47 (“proposing a rule that deals with each type of violation 
separately, and . . . proposing how many violations result in disqualification based 
on the severity of the violation.”). 
 168. Id. at 49 (explaining that because in Minnesota vendors are stores and not 
persons, and because only persons can be criminally convicted, the rule 
permanently disqualifying vendors criminally convicted of trafficking will need to 
be modified). 
 169. Id. at 51 (proposing to use the federal language to define the term 
“launder”). 
 170. See, e.g., the explanation of subpts. 5 & 6 in id. at 50–51 (regarding 
violations for redeeming vouchers in excess of inventory and laundering 
vouchers). 
 171. Id. at 50 (“three–year disqualification of a vendor that provides any 
alcohol or tobacco in exchange for a voucher.”).  USDA Food and Nutrition 
Service has oversight of the state rules and may require revision if the rules are not 
satisfactory.  See 7 C.F.R. § 246.12(a)(3) (2006).  This oversight may account for 
MDH’s decision to explain the more substantial changes but not the more subtle 
tobacco rule change. 
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When the Minnesota version of the WIC tobacco rule is read 
in the context of the rest of the Minnesota WIC rules, however, the 
change from “sale” to “provide” indicates an emphasis on the non-
commercial aspect of the exchange.172  Table 1 compares the 
federal WIC regulations on vendor violations to the Minnesota 
rules adopted from those regulations.173  In most cases, when the 
federal regulations use the word “sale,” or some variation thereof, 
the Minnesota rules do the same.174  When the federal regulations 
use the word “provide,” the Minnesota rules do as well.175  The only 
significant deviation from this pattern is when the Minnesota rules 
address providing alcohol or tobacco in exchange for food 
instruments.176
In its SONAR, MDH acknowledged that the federal regulation 
said “sale,” but it adopted the word “provide” nonetheless: 
Subp. 4.  Providing alcohol or tobacco.  This proposed 
subpart requires (except as provided in subparts 15 and 
16) a three-year disqualification of a vendor that provides 
any alcohol or tobacco in exchange for a voucher.  This 
sanction is mandated by the new federal regulations, 
which state: “The State agency shall disqualify a vendor for 
three years for: (A) One incidence of the sale of alcohol 
or alcoholic beverages or tobacco products in exchange 
for food instruments.”177
The Hy-Vee court and both parties to the case considered the 
parallelism in this proposed rule to indicate that MDH considered 
the Minnesota tobacco rule and the federal tobacco rule to have a 
similar meaning.178  Both terms, however, are undefined, especially 
the broad term “provide” in the Minnesota rule, which has no 
 172. On the objective test for “sale,” see supra notes 77–80 and accompanying 
text. 
 173. See infra Table 1 (comparing 7 C.F.R. § 246.12 (l) (2006) and MINN. R. 
4617.0084 subpts. (2)–(9) (2006)). 
 174. See id. at MINN. R. 4617.0084 subpts. (2), (3), (5). 
 175. See id. at subpts. (7), (9). 
 176. Id. at subpt. (4).  The change from “receiving, transacting, or redeeming 
food instrument outside of authorized channels” to “laundering” is not a 
significant change because Minnesota defines laundering by the terms of the 
federal rule.  See supra note 169 and accompanying text. 
 177. Minnesota Department of Health, “WIC Vendor Rules SONAR Dated 
4/3/00,” in Brief of Appellant at Appendix 56, Hy-Vee Food Stores, Inc. v. Minn. 
Dep’t of Health, 705 N.W.2d 181 (Minn. 2005) (No. A04-0548) (quoting 
WIC/Food Stamp Program Vendor Disqualification, 64 Fed. Reg. 13,311, 13,323 
(Mar. 18 1999) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. § 246.12(k)(1)(iii)(A))). 
 178. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
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commercial meaning.179
C. The Meaning of “Provide” 
Moving the interpretation of the rule outside the context of 
contract law forces the court to examine the statute as a whole to 
determine its meaning and application.  Analogies to other areas of 
law demonstrate the feasibility of using “sale” and “provide” non-
commercially.  The definitions of the remaining vendor violations 
in the WIC rules supply a context in which to consider its 
application. 
Tort law suggests one method of defining “provide” in a non-
commercial context.180  Minnesota’s social host statute, for 
example, prohibits “knowingly or recklessly” permitting the 
consumption of alcohol by persons under twenty-one years of age 
on one’s property.181  Liability attaches to adults who “sold, 
bartered, or furnished or gave to, or purchased for a person under 
the age of 21” alcohol that caused that person’s intoxication.182  
Case law on the statute condenses those five verbs—sold, bartered, 
furnished, gave to, and purchased—into one, stating that the 
defendant “provided” the alcohol to the minor.183
Looking to the rest of the WIC vendor violation rules 
demonstrates that “sale” and “provide” are used in similar but 
distinct contexts.184  The Minnesota rules use “sale” when referring 
to monetary transactions.  Subparts (2), (3), and (5) make up this 
group: (2) “selling vouchers for cash”; (3) “sells vouchers for cash” 
and; (5) “claims reimbursement for the sale.”185  The Minnesota rules 
use “provide” when referring to the exchange of vouchers for items 
other than money.  Subparts (4), (7), and (9) make up this group: 
(4) “provides alcohol . . . or tobacco product in exchange for . . . 
 179. See supra note 116 and accompanying text. 
 180. I do not mean to suggest that Hy-Vee’s alleged violation was a tort; it was a 
violation of an administrative rule. 
 181. MINN. STAT. § 340A.90 subdiv. (1)(a)(1) (2006). 
 182. Id. at subdiv. (1)(a)(2). 
 183. See, e.g., Christianson v. Univ. of Minn. Bd. of Regents, 733 N.W.2d 156, 
157 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007) (“a social host who provided alcohol to a minor”); 
Wollan v. Jahnz, 656 N.W.2d 416, 417 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003) (“for providing 
alcohol to a minor”). 
 184. See infra Table 1 (citing MINN. R. § 4671.0084, subpts. (2)–(9)). 
 185. MINN. R. 4617.0084 subpts. (2), (3), (5) (emphasis added).  The only 
exception to this is “selling firearms, ammunition, explosives, or controlled 
substances in exchange for a food instrument,” found in MINN. R. 4617.0084, 
subpt. (2). 
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vouchers; (7) “provides credit . . . or other nonfood item . . . in 
exchange for a voucher; (9) “providing unauthorized food in 
exchange . . . for voucher.”186
The federal vendor violations rules, by contrast, use verbs to 
demonstrate that the rules are ordered from most severe to least 
severe.187  The rule at the top of the list, criminal trafficking, 
requires permanent disqualification.188  The next three rules, 
including the tobacco rule, involve the verb selling or sale.189  These 
rules are sub-ranked by penalty; non-criminal trafficking earns a 
mandatory six-year disqualification;190 selling alcohol or tobacco 
earns a mandatory three year disqualification;191 and claiming 
reimbursement for sales above documented inventory requires a 
pattern before a three year disqualification.192  The four rules at the 
bottom half of the chart use various verbs, including “provide,” and 
require a pattern of bad behavior before disqualification. 
By changing the verb in the tobacco rule, the Minnesota rules 
break up the pattern of severity that the federal rules create.  
Providing alcohol and tobacco becomes linked with providing a 
nonfood item in subpart (7)193 and providing unauthorized food in 
subpart (9).194  Both of these rules require a pattern of offenses 
before imposing disqualification.  Thus, a minor revision re-
contextualizes only one of two rules with a penalty of mandatory 
disqualification. 
D. Consequences of the Decision 
The history of the WIC Program demonstrates its purpose of 
promoting public health.195  The changes to the rules in the late 
1990s worked to make the program more economically efficient, 
but they still operated within the program’s purpose.196  Consistent 
with this purpose, the administrative history of the vendor violation 
rules indicates that FNS intended an exception for “minor 
 186. MINN. R. 4617.0084 subpts. (4), (7), (9) (emphasis added). 
 187. See infra Table 1 (citing 7 C.F.R. § 246.12(l)(1)(i)–(iv) (2006)). 
 188. 7 C.F.R. § 246.12(l)(i). 
 189. Id. § 246.12(l)(ii)–(iv). 
 190. Id. § 246.12(l)(1)(ii)(A)–(B). 
 191. Id. § 246.12(l)(1)(iii)(A). 
 192. Id. § 246.12(l)(1)(iii)(B). 
 193. MINN. R. 4617.0084, subpt. 7 (West, Westlaw through 2007 amendments). 
 194. Id. 4617.0084, subpt. 9. 
 195. See supra Part IV.B.1.a. 
 196. See supra Part IV.B.1.b–c. 
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unintentional action[s]” even though it defines a vendor violation 
as an intentional or an unintentional action.197  The Minnesota 
rules arguably attempt to codify this exception by changing the 
verb in the tobacco rule in order to encourage comparison with the 
other rules.198  Strict liability for vendors under the WIC tobacco 
rule may also result in negative consequences for WIC participants 
and state administrators. 
First, inefficiency may result in the WIC system.199  The Hy-Vee 
majority argued that it would be unwieldy to hold trials for 
determining each party’s subjective intent.200  The greater 
inefficiency, however, would be to hinder the day-to-day 
commonality of grocery shopping: because of the severe penalty for 
one violation, grocers are more likely to over-check and hassle WIC 
customers to avoid the sale of prohibited products.201  If a mistake is 
made, the customer and the store are more likely to react out of 
fear of government repercussions and may feel restricted in their 
actions.202
Second, the Hy-Vee decision risks upsetting the federal-state 
balance in WIC administration.  WIC is a federal grant-in-aid 
program “for which Congress authorizes a specific amount of 
funding each year for program operations.”203  As such, federal 
regulations limit states’ discretion in adoption and enforcement of 
 197. WIC: Food Delivery Systems, 64 Fed. Reg. 32308-01, 32,316 (June 16, 
1999) (codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 246); see supra Part IV.C. 
 198. See supra notes 190–91 and accompanying text. 
 199. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 1584–87. 
 200. Hy-Vee Food Stores, Inc. v. Minn. Dep’t of Health, 705 N.W.2d 181, 190 
n.8 (Minn. 2005). 
 201. See Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 1585. 
 202. Hy-Vee argued that the sale should be rescinded because it easily could 
have been at the time.  See Brief & Appendix of Appellant, supra note 75, at 19.  
The argument continued, however, that under a strict liability regime, Hy-Vee 
would still be suspended for three years, even if the cigarettes were returned, 
because they had been recorded on the voucher.  Id. at 27–28.  Thus, merchants 
would have no incentive to take back products purchased by mistake by WIC 
customers.  See id.  For her part, the WIC participant immediately called the local 
WIC agency out of fear that her WIC status would be endangered.  See supra note 
64 and accompanying text. 
 203. USDA, WIC: THE SPECIAL SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITION PROGRAM FOR WOMEN, 
INFANTS AND CHILDREN 1 (2006), http://www.fns.usda.gov/wic/WIC-Fact-
Sheet.pdf.  By contrast, an entitlement program would fund everyone who met the 
eligibility requirements.  Id.  WIC is not a block-grant program either.  See Jerry L. 
Mashaw & Dylan S. Calsyn, Block Grants, Entitlements, and Federalism: A Conceptual 
Map of Contested Terrain, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 297, 300 (1996) (defining a block 
grant as, among other things, authorizing federal aid for “a wide range of activities 
within a broadly defined functional area.”). 
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WIC rules.204  Federal grant-in-aid programs, however, are designed 
to strike a balance between federal and state power.205  But in the 
case of WIC, USDA must approve all the rules, and may review and 
revoke rules that are already in force.206  Minnesota is the first to 
interpret the WIC tobacco rule since its promulgation in 2002.  The 
court’s complete deference to the federal version of the rule, 
demonstrated by using the federal rule’s language rather than 
trying to define the state’s own term, sets a precedent for other 
states that may further upset the federal-state balance in aid 
programs.207
E. The Hy-Vee Case Under a Contextual Analysis 
Stepping away from the U.C.C. analysis of the rule and looking 
to the wording of the Minnesota tobacco rule required an 
examination of the context of the Minnesota rule: its history, 
enactment, and structure.  This context may be marshaled to create 
an argument that both the federal and state rules intended a lesser 
penalty than a three year suspension for minor, unintentional 
errors of a cashier. 
The dissent to the Hy-Vee decision, in fact, made a similar 
argument.  Justice Hanson looked to the other WIC rules that 
“require proof of a pattern or series of what appear to be regarded 
by USDA as equally serious violations before a mandatory 
disqualification [can be] imposed.”208  He concluded that he was 
“reluctant to imply administrative agency authority to impose more 
severe sanctions where express authority to do so is not clear.”209
The problem remains, however, that neither the federal nor 
the state rules provide any explicit alternatives for the exceptional 
 204. See 7 C.F.R. § 246.4 (2007) (giving USDA power to accept or reject a 
state’s WIC oversight plan and instituting reporting procedures). 
 205. See Bruce J. Casino, Federal Grants-in-Aid: Evolution, Crisis, and Future, 20 
URB. LAW. 25, 65 (1988) (explaining how grants-in-aid appeal to American 
preferences for services at the local level and yet how national political agreements 
and trends affect what type of and what amount of grants an area will get). 
 206. See 7 C.F.R. §§ 246.19–.21 (2007) (establishing guidelines for FNS review, 
audits, and investigations of state agencies). 
 207. See Christine N. Cimini, Principles of Non-Arbitrariness: Lawlessness in the 
Administration of Welfare, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 451, 510 (2005) (discussing the fair 
and equitable application of administrative rules); David A. Super, Rethinking Fiscal 
Federalism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2544, 2562–79 (2005). 
 208. Hy-Vee Food Stores, Inc. v. Minn. Dep’t of Health, 705 N.W.2d 181, 192 
(Minn. 2005) (citing 7 C.F.R. § 246.12(l)(1)(iii)(B)–(F)). 
 209. Id. 
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cases.  Even if the language of the Minnesota statute points to its 
context, that context can serve only as an aide to interpretation; it 
cannot overrule the explicit language of the statute.210
Trying the case under the Minnesota rule, using the word 
“provide,” therefore, might look different because of the analysis of 
“provide” within the context of the rule, but it would come to the 
same result.  Hy-Vee would still be suspended as a WIC vendor for 
three years.  Under the tobacco rule as it is currently written, there 
is no avoiding strict liability for vendors. 
F.  Toward a New Federal Policy 
The case of Hy-Vee demonstrates how leaving states with little 
discretion over certain federal WIC regulations has pitted the states 
against their own populations.  The solution is to bring the WIC 
rule in-line with the other vendor violations.  Requiring a pattern of 
violations, even as few as two violations, before disqualifying a 
vendor would have several benefits.211  First, the increased hostility 
toward WIC customers would be lessened because strict liability will 
no longer apply.212  In addition, vendors would get a warning after 
their first violation.213  This would not only give them a chance to 
retrain their employees, but it would also lessen the frequency of 
litigation on the matter.214  If they have been given a chance to 
rectify the situation, a penalty after the second infraction will come 
as less of a surprise and seem less severe.215
V. CONCLUSION 
The afterlife of Hy-Vee thus far has been limited.  It has been 
cited for its statements on when to defer to administrative 
agencies216 and for its reliance on an objective standard for sales 
 210. See MINN. STAT. § 645.16 (2006) (stating as a canon of construction that 
“the letter of the law shall not be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing the 
spirit”). 
 211. See Hy-Vee, 705 N.W.2d at 192 (Hanson, J., dissenting) (suggesting a 
reluctance to impose disqualification for one violation where other WIC rules 
require a pattern). 
 212. See supra notes 201–202 and accompanying text. 
 213. This is standard procedure for most vendor violations.  MINN. R. 
4617.0084, subpt. 18 (West, Westlaw through 2007 amendments). 
 214. This was a concern of the majority.  See Hy-Vee, 705 N.W.2d at 190 n.8. 
 215. See generally Cimini, supra note 207. 
 216. See, e.g., Wolter v. Dep’t of Human Servs., No. A06-1139, 2007 WL 
1470437, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. May 22, 2007). 
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contracts.217  But the Hy-Vee decision and the pendant difficulties in 
striking a balance between federal and state regulation is a 
symptom of a growing problem in the national welfare system. 
Scholars generally agree that a balance between federal and 
state regulation is the best outcome for the federal welfare 
system.218  Since PRWORA, however, the trend has been to give the 
states broad discretion in spending with little federal oversight.219  
At the same time, requirements for grants-in-aid programs, such as 
WIC, have become more specific and demanding.220  The problems 
with the WIC tobacco rule are an indicator that the regulation of 





 217. See, e.g., Cargill Inc. v. Jorgenson Farms, 719 N.W.2d 226, 233 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 2006) (“[F]ormation of a sales contract requires the mutual assent of the 
parties . . . .”). 
 218. See Casino, supra note 205, at 65. 
 219. See Cimini, supra note 207, at 452–56. 
 220. See Super, supra note 207, at 2590. 
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Table 1. Comparison of Minnesota WIC Vendor Disqualification 
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